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Gannett Co. v. DePasquale:1
A Judicial Aberration
By SUSAN FREYA SWIFT*
For free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished




The Burger Court has not been kind to the First Amendment.
Decisions such as Branzburg v. Hayes,$ Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,'
and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale have severely impaired press and
public access to information traditionally regarded as freely availa-
ble under the First Amendment.
The balance between free speech and fair trial was at issue in
both Bridges v. California and Gannett. In Gannett, the setting
was a pretrial suppression hearing; the specific issue was exclusion
of the press and public to protect the defendants' right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. The right to be judged by an impartial
jury is a primary component of a criminal defendant's due process
rights,' and due process is essential to fair criminal justice. The
1. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
* Member, Class of 1981.
2. 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
3. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This decision limited reporters' rights to conceal the sources of
news stories; further, dicta in that case indicate that access rights to governmental informa-
tion could be restricted should an accused's right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal
be at stake. Id. at 684-85.
4. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). The plurality opinion by Justice Burger denied press access rights to
a "rehabilitation center" in Alameda County, California.
5. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
6. Mandatory procedural requirements are outlined by the Sixth Amendment, which
reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
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right of all citizens to fair treatment by the prosecutorial system
contributes immeasurably to a climate of openness and free-
dom-the goal of a democracy.
Due process may be threatened by pretrial publicity, which is a
major source of juror prejudice in notorious criminal cases.7 Con-
trolled experimentation has shown that exposure to prejudicial in-
formation prior to trial produces 41% more verdicts of guilty from
individual jurors.8 Because the purpose of pretrial suppression
hearings is to cull improperly obtained or otherwise inadmissible
evidence, the danger of prejudice is particularly acute when infor-
mation revealed during such hearings is disseminated.9 While high-
ly publicized criminal trials are rare, it is by now axiomatic that,
regardless of the level of notoriety that she or he has attained,
every defendant is entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 0
Although pretrial publicity can be prejudicial to a criminal de-
fendant's due process rights, publication of information about the
judicial system is crucial to maintain the fairness of the system."
Further, dissemination of information about the government is
critical to continuing the free and open political system that is at
once the method and goal of democracy.
The Gannett decision is interesting, not in its resolution of the
clash between the First Amendment rights of the press and the
Sixth Amendment rights of the individual, but in its revelation
that previous Supreme Court decisions have analyzed the First
Amendment problem out of existence. Therefore, the Court must
rely upon the Sixth Amendment's "public trial" provision to find a
right of access to pretrial suppression hearings. Justice Stewart's
extensive Sixth Amendment analysis decides both too much and
too little. Gannett does not explicitly contain a holding settling the
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of coun-
sel for his defense." See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 557 n.13 (1978).
7. 443 U.S. at 378. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965); Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
8. Padawer-Singer & Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors' Verdicts in
COURTS AND THE NEWS MEDIA, 35, 132-37 (1973).
9. 443 U.S. at 378. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 444 (1972).
10. See A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 71 (1967) (hereinafter cited as
FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB); Nebraska Press Ass'n'v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976); see note 6,
supra.
11. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541 (1965); see also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION 456 (1970).
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issue of the case, but the Court delivers strong dicta denying the
existence of a constitutional right of public access to criminal trials
generally."
1. Statement of the Case
In July, 1976, a former policeman named Wayne Clapp disap-
peared in Seneca County, New York. He had last been seen going
fishing on Lake Seneca with two unknown male companions. Al-
though Clapp's body was never found, his boat, riddled with bullet
holes, was soon recovered. Clapp's two companions, Kyle Edwin
Greathouse and David Ray Jones, were apprehended after an in-
terstate investigation revealed Clapp's truck parked at a motel in
Jackson County, Michigan. The men were returned to New York
and arraigned on charges of grand larceny and second degree mur-
.der on July 25, and were subsequently indicted on these charges,
as well as on robbery counts, by a Seneca County grand jury. 3 The
foregoing facts, plus other details of the Clapp case, were reported
by the local media. Two newspapers owned by the Gannett Com-
pany, Inc., published a total of fifteen articles about the case be-
tween July 20 and August 6, 1976.1"
At a hearing before Daniel A. DePasquale, Judge of the Seneca
County Court, the defense moved to suppress allegedly involuntary
statements made by the defendants to the police, and physical evi-
dence seized as "fruits" of the possibly coerced confessions. Al-
though no Gannett publication had appeared concerning the case
for several weeks before this November 4 hearing, the defense re-
quested that the press and public be excluded because, it con-
tended, adverse publicity had already endangered the defendants'
right to receive a fair trial, and more prejudicial publicity would
likely arise from information divulged at the hearing. The prose-
cuting attorney had no objection, and the trial judge granted the
motion. Carol Ritter, a Gannett Company reporter, was among the
persons excluded from the hearing at that time."
Shortly before the closed suppression hearing ended the next
day, Ritter submitted a written request to Judge DePasquale seek-
ing a postponement of the hearing to allow for argument on the
12. 443 U.S. at 391, 394.
13. Id. at 371-74.
14. Brief of Petitioner at 7-8, Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
15. 443 U.S. at 374-75.
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access issue. She asserted a right to cover the hearing, requested
access to the transcripts, and moved the court to set aside its ex-
clusionary order."
Ritter's motion was heard after the parties had filed briefs. The
judge found that "an open suppression hearing would pose a 'rea-
sonable probability of prejudice to these defendants',"' whose
right to a fair trial outweighed any public or press right of access.
The judge denied Gannett's motion and "sealed the transcript of
the suppression hearing in perpetuity.""e
Gannett promptly challenged DePasquale's decision in the Su-
preme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division.'9 That
court found that the DePasquale order constituted an unlawful
prior restraint on publication violative of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and vacated the order, 0 stating:
Logic compels the conclusion that where an exclusionary order is
entered merely as a substitute for a "gag order" which would oth-
erwise place a direct restraint on what the press can publish, such
exclusionary order . . . is merely a substitute for a direct prior
restraint where, as here, the sole purpose behind the order is to
prevent the publication of what transpires in the courtroom dur-
ing a pretrial hearing.2'
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held that Judge
DePasquale had the power to exclude the public and the press
from the hearing in question, and that his exercise of that power
did not constitute an abuse of discretion." The majority rejected
the dissent's retention of the prior restraint analysis of the
problem.23
Petitioner Gannett Company appealed the case to the U.S. Su-
preme Court. Because of the "significance of the constitutional
questions involved,"2 4 the Court granted certiorari and subse-
quently found for the respondents Judge DePasquale, defendants
Greathouse and Jones, and Stuart 0. Miller, District Attorney of
16. Brief of Petitioner at 4-5; id. at 375.
17. Id. at 376.
18. Brief of Petitioner at 5. The transcript was released after the defendants pleaded
guilty to lesser included offenses. 443 U.S. at 376 n.4.
19. Id. at 376.
20. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976) (per curiam).
21. 55 A.D.2d at 111; 389 N.Y.S.2d at 722 (emphasis in opinion).
22. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 372 N.E.2d 544 (1977).
23. Id. at 381, 385; 401 N.Y.S.2d at 756; 372 N.E.2d at 549.
24. 443 U.S. at 377.
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Seneca County.
2. The Court's Opinion
The lead opinion, written by Justice Potter Stewart, asked
"whether members of the public have an independent constitu-
tional right to insist upon access to a pretrial judicial proceeding,
even though the accused, the prosecutor, and the trial judge all
have agreed to the closure of that proceeding in order to assure a
fair trial."2 5
After discussing the facts of the case, the lower court decisions,
and the question of mootness," Justice Stewart tackled the basic
problem: potentially prejudicial effects of publicity concerning pre-
trial suppression hearings. He maintained that as the "purpose of
such hearings is to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evi-
dence and insure that this evidence does not become known to the
jury. . . . Closure of pretrial proceedings is often one of the most
effective methods that a trial judge can employ to attempt to in-
sure that the fairness of a trial will not be jeopardized. . . .
Stewart then analyzed the Sixth Amendment's public trial provi-
sion in detail. He theorized that Sixth Amendment guarantees,
such as the right to notice, confrontation, compulsory process, im-
partial jury, and speedy and public trial, are rights which belong
only to the defendant and have as their "overriding purpose the
protection of the accused from prosecutorial and judicial abuses."2
He contended that neither the Sixth Amendment nor any of the
Court's previous decisions confer a "right in members of the public
to insist upon a public trial."2 9 While he acknowledged the "strong
societal interest in public trials," Justice Stewart was unwilling to
accord such an interest any protection beyond that currently af-
forded by the judicial system. He felt this protection was safe-
guarded by "our adversary system of criminal justice [which] is
premised upon the proposition that the public interest is fully pro-
25. Id. at 370-71.
26. Id. at 377-78. The mootness problem-the fact that the hearing at issue had ended
long before appellate review was complete-was disposed of quite adequately by the New
York Court of Appeals. Both that court and the Supreme Court relied upon the jurisdic-
tional test set forth in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976). Put simply,
a court may retain jurisdiction if a dispute is capable of repetition yet evades timely review.
27. 443 U.S. at 378-79.
28. Id. at 379.
29. Id. at 381.
30. Id. at 383.
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tected by the participants in the litigation."" Specifically, Justice
Stewart relied upon the prosecutor to defend the public interest in
criminal cases.32
Although he noted "the existence of a common-law rule of open
civil and criminal proceedings,"33 and determined that the Framers
of the Bill of Rights presumed that trials would normally be open
to the public," Justice Stewart maintained that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not require public trials in any case, civil or criminal.35
The Court therefore held "that members of the public have no
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to attend criminal trials." 6
Regarding pretrial proceedings, Justice Stewart declared that le-
gal history "fails to demonstrate that the Framers of the Sixth
Amendment intended to create a constitutional right in strangers
to attend a pretrial proceeding, when all that they actually did was
to confer upon the accused an explicit right to demand a public
trial."37 He pointed out that pretrial proceedings have never been
"characterized by the same degree of openness"" as trials, and
that the Field Code of Criminal Procedure, pertinent parts of
which are still law in several states, explicitly confers the right to
demand closed pretrial proceedings upon the defendant.39 He con-
cluded that "[c]losed pretrial proceedings have been a familiar
part of the judicial landscape in this country . . . .".o
Justice Stewart then analyzed Gannett Company's contention
that the press and public had a right of access to the pretrial hear-
ing under the First Amendment, as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth. He did not address the problem squarely, but
stated that "the actions of the trial judge here were consistent with
any right of access that petitioner [Gannett] may have had under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments."" He emphasized that al-
31. Id. at 384.
32. Id. at 384 n.12. See text accompanying notes 153-54, infra.
33. Id. at 384.
34. Id. at 385.
35. Id. at 386-87.
36. Id. at 391.
37. Id. at 385-86.
38. Id. at 388.
39. Id. at 390; see also Commissioners of Practice and Pleadings, Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, § 202 (1850). For a listing of those states with such closure provisions, see note 144,
infra.
40. Id. at 390.
41. Id. at 392.
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though Gannett's reporter made no timely objection to the closure
motion, petitioner was not prevented from challenging the exclu-
sionary order at a judicial proceeding. 2 The Court then noticed
the trial judge's procedure and evidently approved: respondent
DePasquale had balanced the competing rights and interests, and
found that, since an "open proceeding would pose a 'reasonable
probability of prejudice to [the] defendants',""' the suppression
hearing should remain closed and the transcript sealed until all
danger of prejudice had passed.""
In conclusion the Court held that no part of the Constitution
gave petitioner Gannett an affirmative right of access to the pre-
trial proceeding in question, where "all the participants in the liti-
gation [have] agreed that it should be closed to protect the fair-
trial rights of the defendants.""5
Justice Stewart's opinion in Gannett is noteworthy for several
reasons. First, the opinion was joined without further comment by
only one Justice, John Paul Stevens. Three other Justices - War-
ren Burger, Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist - felt com-
pelled to file concurring opinions to clarify the lead opinion, to
comment upon it, or to openly disagree with it. Additionally, the
Court's summary treatment of the First Amendment issues war-
rants examination in light of previous decisions of the Burger
Court. Finally, Justice Stewart's sweeping denial of public access
to criminal trials as well as suppression hearings is not only super-
fluous and misleading, but, as will be explained, is historically and
constitutionally unnecessary.
3. Gannett and the First Amendment"
The First Amendment is the source of some of this country's
most cherished freedoms. Its absolute language and wide coverage
of many different societal concerns places it in "the central posi-
42. It is interesting that the Court expects reporters, who are trained to observe and not
to intervene, to interrupt a newsworthy event. Following the publication of the Gannett
opinion, Gannett Company instituted a new policy; Gannett reporters now carry a card in-
structing them to contest attempts to close judicial proceedings on First Amendment
grounds. TIME, Jan. 28, 1980, at 1.
43. 443 U.S. at 392-93.
44. Id. at 393.
45. Id. at 394.
46. This section is not an analysis of either the First Amendment or the Burger Court's




tion . . . in the constitutional scheme."4 7 The First Amendment is
often treated as more than the sum of its parts; 8 together with
several other amendments, it is said to "have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."""
It is reasonable to assert that the right of access to governmental
information is among the penumbral rights which gives "life and
substance" to the First Amendment.
Several of the rights assured in the First Amendment are critical
to the American political process: freedom of speech and of the
press, freedom to assemble peacefully, and freedom to petition the
government for redress of grievances.50 These rights, along with the
right to vote,"' are basic to the American democratic system. Im-
plicit in these rights are certain attendant rights or responsibilities
necessary to the correct functioning of the express constitutional
rights. The right to vote, for example, brings with it a correspond-
ing responsibility to vote thoughtfully and intelligently; rational
decisionmaking is dependent upon information about that which is
being decided.
The press performs the vital function of information gathering
for the public. As with the right to vote, the unabridged right to
publish creates an obligation to exercise that right respon-
sibly-that is, to report events accurately." This obligation cannot
be met without free access to information. "[W]ithout some pro-
tection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated."5
One of the tenets of First Amendment analysis is that no in-
fringement on freedom of speech or of the press will be tolerated in
the absence of a significant governmental interest that is
threatened by the exercise of those rights." Moreover, before such
47. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 582 (1978).
48. Freedom of association is a good example of this synergism; though not specifically
mentioned in the amendment, it has nonetheless been found to exist.
49. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (Douglas, J.).
50. See note 4, supra. These First Amendment rights are not being labeled "political
rights" since they are widely recognized to have a broader application. See TRIBE, supra
note 47, at 577-79.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, and amend. XII, XV, XVII, IX, XXIV, XXVI.
52. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976).
53. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
54. See TRIBE, supra note 47, at 575, 581-83, 602-03. This is basically a "clear and present
danger" approach.
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infringement is allowed, it must be demonstrated that there are no
adequate alternative means to protect the state's interest." These
principles underlie the Supreme Court's apprdach to/the use of
prior restraints on publication.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart" is the major decision in this
area. Like Gannett, Nebraska Press involved potentially prejudi-
cial pre-trial publicity. The trial judge in Nebraska Press at-
tempted to mitigate the effects of publicity on the jury pool by
imposing a prior restraint on publication of information obtained
at open proceedings, rather than by excluding the press and public
from attendance. The Supreme Court held that the prior restraint
imposed on reporting of open judicial proceedings was invalid: al-
though the trial judge had been justified in concluding that the
pretrial publicity might impair the accused's rights," he had made
no explicit finding that methods other than prior restraint would
not have assured the defendant a fair trial." Furthermore, the effi-
cacy of prior restraint was, on the facts, dubious; Chief Justice
Burger noted jurisdictional and other problems of managing and
enforcing such restraining orders."
The analysis in Nebraska Press focuses on (a) the nature and
effect of the publications; (b) whether other measures short of the
proposed infringement on First Amendment rights would prevent
the dangerous effect of the publications; and (c) whether the re-
straint would actually mitigate or prevent any threatened harm.60
This approach is reminiscent of the clear and present danger stan-
dard, and while the Court never used the phrase "clear and pre-
sent danger," Chief Justice Burger did quote Judge Learned
Hand's reformulation of that test in analyzing the facts and issues
presented by the case." Moreover, this approach is customarily
used in deciding cases where First Amendment speech, press, and
assembly rights are implicated.
In Gannett, however, a majority of the Court did not use this
55. Id. at 621; See also Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Informa-
tion, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1521 (1974).
56. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
57. Id. at 563.
58. Id. at 563-65.
59. Id. at 565-67.
60. Id. at 562.
61. Id.
62. For a more detailed examination of the "clear and present danger" test, see TRIBE,
supra note 47, at 623-31.
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approach. Justice Stewart wrote that since respondent DePasquale
had found that public and press access to the supression hearing
would pose a "reasonable probability of prejudice" to the defen-
dants' fair trial rights, access could be cut off." The Court ackowl-
edged that a right of access might exist, but it declined to so hold.
Further, Justice Stewart wrote, "this putative right was given all
appropriate deference . . ."" However, neither Judge DePasquale
nor the Supreme Court found that methods other than closure
could not afford the defendants a fair trial. That the Court implic-
itly adopted a mode of analysis different from the usual First
Amendment tests and standards is a strong indication that any
right of access the press and the public may have to judicial pro-
ceedings is not, in the Gannett Court's opinion, founded upon the
First Amendment's assurances of freedom of speech and press. Re-
gardless of dicta in Branzburg v. Hayes,"5 and several strongly
worded dissents and concurrences of a minority of the justices,"
the Burger Court has consistenily declined to find any First
Amendment right of access to judicial or other governmental infor-
mation." While the compelling nature of the competing state in-
terest in Gannett-protection of a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights-can perhaps justify diminution of any First
Amendment access rights, the Court has not supported the notion
of public and press access even in cases where less significant gov-
ernmental interests were implicated.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.6 illustrates this point. Houchins in-
volved the denial by Alameda County Sheriff Thomas Houchins of
press and public access to the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita.
The inhumane conditions at Santa Rita were notorious and the
subject of considerable legitimate public interest." Houchins as-
serted that although no disturbances had previously occurred as a
result of media access, "unregulated access by the media would in-
fringe inmate privacy, and tend to create 'jail celebrities,' who in
63. 443 U.S. at 392-93 (quoting with approval the trial court's decision).
64. Id. at 392.
65. See text accompanying note 53, supra.
66. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Houchins v. KQED-TV, 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 411 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
68. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
69. Cairney, Sunlight in the County Jail: Houchins v. KQED, Inc. and Constitutional
Protection for Newsgathering, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 933, 933-34 (1979).
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turn tend to generate internal problems and undermine jail secur-
ity. He also contended that unscheduled media tours would dis-
rupt jail operations."7 0 While the Court in Houchins found for the
Sheriff, it did not hold that the state's interest in running its penal
institutions in a particular fashion justified the denial of KQED-
TV's First Amendment rights. Instead, Chief Justice Burger, in
considering the First Amendment, explicitly rejected the "assertion
that the public and the media have a First Amendment right to
government information regarding the conditions of jails and their
inmates and presumably all other public facilities such as hospitals
and mental institutions."' The Chief Justice further wrote that
"[tihis Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of
a right of access to all sources of information within governmental
control."7
The holdings of Nebraska Press, Houchins, and Gannett, to-
gether with dicta from these cases, demonstrate the. Supreme
Court's narrow interpretation of the First Amendment "press"
clause. While protecting the direct exercise of publication rights
(as in Nebraska Press), the Court's view that information gather-
ing is not part of the protected right "eviscerates"73 the right of
publication. The majority's approach ignores the intended function
of the First Amendment. This can be seen most clearly when one
compares the cases involving denial of access, or exclusion, with
those imposing prior restraints on publication. While the Burger
Court consistently draws a distinction between the issues of exclu-
sion and prior restraint," this view is not universally accepted. A
concept of the First Amendment which includes that provision's
societal functions77 would embrace all the activities of the press
which contribute to the free flow of information in American soci-
ety. Access to information would then be protected.
Justice Stewart was able to deal with the First Amendment as-
pects of the Gannett case in less than two pages7" because previous
70. 438 U.S. 1, 5.
71. Id. at 14.
72. Id. at 9.
73. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
74. See text accompanying notes 47-53, supra.
75. See 443 U.S. at 393 n.25; 438 U.S. at 10.
76. Note that the New York Court of Appeals vacated the exclusion order at issue in
Gannett as an unlawful prior retraint. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 47-53, supra.
78. This view has been capably analyzed in Cairney, supra note 69, at 943-44.
79. 443 U.S. at 391-93.
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decisions of the Burger Court consistently denied that a right of
access to governmental information exists under the First Amend-
ment. Absent a First Amendment right, any constitutional right of
public access to judicial proceedings must be found elsewhere in
the Constitution.
4. Gannett and the Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment, along. with several other provisions of
the Bill of Rights,80 substantively outlines the meaning of due pro-
cess in criminal cases. Our judicial system formally entitles persons
accused of committing a crime to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury in the geographical area where the crime was com-
mitted. Defendants must be informed of the charges against them;
they may also use the court's subpoena power to compel the ap-
pearance of witnesses and they have the right to the assistance of
legal counsel.8'
The public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment is the result
of tradition founded on social policy. In the Anglo-Saxon system of
jurisprudence, trials have been public since before the Norman in-
vasion of England in 1066.8' At common law, courts of justice were
always open. 3
Commentators on the common law of England have noted many
advantageous functions that publicity played in the administration
of justice. For example, Jeremy Bentham wrote that publicity en-
courages witnesses to testify truthfully and forces the court re-
porter ("registrator") to record the proceedings accurately." Fur-
ther, the attendance of strangers at a proceeding acts as a check
against judicial partiality and misconduct. Publicity "keeps the
judge himself, while trying, under trial."" Public access to trials
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, VIII, XIV.
81. See note 5, supra.
82. F. POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW, 140 (1904); E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF
ENGLISH LAW, 91 (1929) [hereinafter cited as JENKS]: Note, Legal History: Origins of the
Public Trial, 35 IND. L.J. 251, 252 (1960); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q.
381 (1932).
83. 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, 594 [hereinafter cited as BENTHAM);
JENKS, supra note 82; M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 343-344 (c.
1670, 6th ed. 1820) [hereinafter cited as HALE]; 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1834 (2d ed.
1923) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Note, Legal History: Origins of the Public Trial,
supra note 82, at 253.
84. BENTHAM, supra note 83, at 522-23; see also HALE, supra note 83, at 345. "Regis-
trator" is Bentham's term.
85. BENTHAM, supra note 83, at 523.
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also has an educational function: people learn both "the love of
justice" and the state of the laws which they are expected to
obey." Public access also promotes consistency among proceed-
ings.87 Finally, Bentham believed that open proceedings protect
liberty against despotism and caprice.88
Therefore, at common law, trials were not public only to benefit
the accused.89 Access to trials was not merely a common law tradi-
tion but an actionable right, as illustrated by the 1829 case of
Daubney v. Cooper.9o In that action, plaintiff Daubney was forcibly
ejected from a magistrate's proceeding. He filed suit against the
clerk, Cooper, who had ordered his ejection. Daubney won his case
and was awarded costs and damages. The ruling was predicated on
the fact that the proceeding in question was judicial in nature, and
"it is one of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice that its
proceedings should be public, and that all parties who may be de-
sirous of hearing what is going on . . . have a right to be present
0~91
Exceptions to the rule of public access to judicial proceedings
were rare at common law.92 Jenks noted that "exceptions to the
rule of open court . . . [consisted] practically only of three cases:"
(1) where children were asked to give evidence in cases "involving
decency or morality;" (2) where trade secrets, unprotected by pat-
ent, were involved; and (3) where the national security was
threatened.98 Wigmore saw exceptions to the rule of open court as
falling into two categories: special classes of cases, such as divorce
or rape, and special classes of persons (i.e. minors).94 Bayley, the
judge in Daubney v. Cooper, stated that all persons who wished to
observe judicial proceedings could do so "if there be room in the
place for that purpose-provided that they do not interrupt the
proceedings.""
86. Id. at 525.
87. Id. at 527.
88. Id. at 590. The assertion that open proceedings protect freedom is not ridiculous if
the present American criminal justice system is as corrupt as some commentators believe.
See FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 10, at 145-47.
89. See 35 IND. L.J. 251, supra note 82, at 253; 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, supra note 82, at 384.
90. 10 Barnewall & Cresswell 237, 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (1829).
91. Id. at 240, 109 Eng. Rep. at 440.
92. BENTHAM, supra note 83, at 529.
93. JENKs, supra note 82, at 92.
94. WIGMORE, supra note 83, § 1835.
95. 10 Barnewall & Cresswell at 240, 109 Eng. Rep. at 440. The common law commenta-
tors do not uniformly agree upon the permissibility of exclusion of the public and press in
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Additionally, publication of events which transpired in the com-
mon law court was favored. Bentham noted that the right to record
proceedings without publication would be meaningless and that
publication operated against possible misrepresentation of court-
room events."e
Little information exists on the origins of pretrial proceedings.
In England, preliminary examinations were formalized by statute
in 1554." Such proceedings lacked many of the due process rights
we have come to expect. Neither the accused nor the public had a
right to be present. Secrecy was rationalized by the outmoded no-
tion that access would give the accused an advantage the law did
not then afford him: advance knowledge of the evidence to be used
against him at trial." A major revision of the English law regarding
preliminary hearings took place in 1848. The accused gained the
right to attend the hearings, and thereafter they were open to the
public.99
The colonial American judicial system derived much from the
English common law, including the public right of access to trials.
Trials were public before and during the Revolutionary Era. 00
Passage of the Bill of Rights did not alter this tradition; open trials
were and are the norm in the United States.'0 Furthermore, re-
porting and publishing of court proceedings is allowed, even sanc-
tioned, by the Supreme Court's interpretations of the First
Amendment.o'0 However, in Houchins v. KQED-TV, 03 the Court
recently stated that the press had no special right of access to gov-
order to preserve the defendant's right to a jury untouched by prejudicial publicity. While
Wigmore and Bayley mention it as an allowable exception, Bentham does not.
96. BENTHAM, supra note 83, at 526. See also WIGMORE, supra note 83, § 1836 (for
exceptions).
97. Potts, The Preliminary Examination and "The Third Degree", 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 131,
132 (1950).
98. Geis, Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 397, 399-400 (1961); see
also Potts, supra note 97, at 132.
99. Geis, supra note 98, at 400. See also F. MAITLAND, JUSTICE AND POLICE 129 (1885).
100. 35 IND. L.J., supra note 82, at 256; 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY 129-30, 140, 271 (1971).
101. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1947). The Court could not find a single instance of a
criminal trial conducted in camera in any court in the history of the U.S.
102. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965) (relying on Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941), and Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 311 (1946)). See also 2 T. COOLEY, A TREA-
TISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 931-32 (8th ed. 1927).
103. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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ernmental information.'o4
Limitations on the right of access to judicial proceedings gener-
ally have been few and fall into one of several categories. American
judges have been afforded control over their courtrooms, and must
maintain an atmosphere of decorum suitable for the administra-
tion of justice.1 05 Accordingly, courts may deny access to disruptive
spectators and may terminate access where the number of persons
who want to attend a proceeding overwhelm the facilities and
space available. 0 Also, judges have generally provided a closed
court in instances where the public presence would stifle effective
testimony. Such closure is typical in.cases of juvenile rape and is
also commonly decreed where testimony is expected to be obscene
or embarrassing. This exclusion might also be founded upon a de-
sire to protect public morals.0  Closure is sometimes permitted to
protect trade secrets. 08 Finally, the government's interest in the
areas of law enforcement and national security may occasionally
require closure. 09
Prior to Gannett, trials were not often closed, even when public-
ity threatened the impartiality of a jury or jury pool and, therefore,
the criminally accused's due process rights." 0 Supreme Court pre-
cedent mandated that trial judges use any of a group of alterna-
tives:"' change of venue, use of voir dire and peremptory chal-
lenges by the defense, continuance, waiver of jury trial, and
sequestration of the jury." There are, admittedly, problems with
these alternatives. The Sixth Amendment not only assures a defen-
dant a public trial, but also gives the right to a speedy trial in the
county of venue before an impartial jury. "* While the importance
of speed and location are sometimes arguable,"" no criminal defen-
dant should be forced to waive his or her jury right because of
prejudicial publicity. While a searching voir dire may reveal jurors
104. See text accompanying notes 68-72, supra.
105. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
106. U.S. v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1949).
107. Id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 47, at 629 n.28; Note, The Constitutional Right to a
Public Trial, 20 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1907).
108. See TRIBE, supra note 107.
109. Id.
110. See note 101, supra.
111. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
112. Id. at 363.
113. See note 6, supra.




who are biased, it is suspected that some potential veniremen are
less than candid in admitting their prejudices."" Sequestration of
the jury may be ineffective if pretrial publicity has reached the at-
tention of jurors;ue sequestration also may engender juror impa-
tience and resentment toward the accused.117
Retrials and dismissals are methods of last resort. These alterna-
tives are open admissions that the judicial system has failed to give
a defendant a fair trial and are better only than unjust
incarceration."
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly defined "prejudicial
pretrial publicity," some idea of the meaning of the phrase may be
drawn from past cases.
Irvin v. Dowd"* was the first state conviction that the Supreme
Court struck down on the basis of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In
that case, reports of the defendant's confession were published ex-
tensively; juror voir dire revealed a "pattern of deep and bitter
prejudice""20 toward the defendant in the community of venue.
Ninety percent of the prospective jurors entertained an opinion as
to the guilt of the accused "ranging in intensity from mere suspi-
cion to absolute certainty.""
In Rideau v. Louisiana,"' the Court held that since a twenty-
minute film of the defendant's confession had been broadcast lo-
cally three times prior to trial, denial of a motion for a change of
venue amounted to a denial of due process.
The case of Estes v. Texas,"8 which involved the trial of Billie
Sol Estes on charges of swindling, featured live television broad-
casts of pretrial hearings and substantial television coverage of the
trial. In the Court's view, the number of spectators and media per-
sonnel permitted inside the courtroom was both disruptive and
distracting to the jury. " The Court came very close to holding
that television coverage is unconstitutional as violative of an ac-
115. FRIENDLY & GOLDPARB, supra note 10, at 103.
116. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965).
117. FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 10, at 110.
118. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
119. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
120. Id. at 727.
121. Id.
122. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
123. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
124. Id. at 546.
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cused's right to a fair trial."'
Perhaps the most outrageous of this line of cases is Sheppard v.
Maxwell. 2 6 The Supreme Court held in Sheppard that the trial
judge's failure to protect the defendant sufficiently from the "mas-
sive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity"' 27 that accompanied pros-
ecution for the murder of his wife deprived Sheppard of a fair trial.
The Court detailed the extreme pretrial publicity, which included
publication of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
prospective jurors,128 promotion of leaks and rumors by personnel
under the control of the trial judge' 29 and extensive coverage by
three local (Cleveland) newspapers and various broadcasting me-
dia. 30 Notably, motions for continuance, change of venue, and mis-
trial were all denied,'3 ' though the pervasive presence of the print
and broadcast media in the courthouse and in the courtroom it-
self'3 2 constantly exposed the jurors to the publicity."' The Court
declared that there was no doubt that the "deluge of publicity"
reached the jury.' The failure of the trial judge to maintain the
proper decorum resulted in a "carnival atmosphere," 3 5 the Court
concluded, and it implied that the behavior of the trial judge and
other officers of the court was "worthy of disciplinary measures."se
Conversely, the Court has upheld convictions obtained in the
face of potentially prejudicial publicity. For example, in U.S. ex
rel. Darcy v. Handy, '7 possibly adverse pretrial publicity was at
issue. However, in that case a complete voir dire was conducted,
and the defendant did not use all the peremptory challenges avail-
able to him, nor did the defense seek a continuance or a change of
venue. Although the proceedings were covered by the news media,
the jury was sequestered. The Supreme Court found that no atmo-
sphere of "prejudice and hysteria" 38 prevailed; the proceedings
125. Id. at 549, 563; FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 10, at 216-24.
126. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
127. Id. at 335.
128. Id. at 342.
129. Id. at 359.
130. Id. at 342-43.
131. Id. at 347-48.
132. Id. at 342-44.
133. Id. at 344, 356.
134. Id. at 357.
135. Id. at 358.
136. Id. at 363.
137. 351 U.S. 454 (1956).
138. Id. at 463.
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were orderly, and the news reporting was factual and restrained.
The potential for prejudice existed, but none was shown. Accord-
ingly, the defendant's conviction was upheld.
In Murphy v. Florida,8 9 a robbery conviction was upheld de-
spite pretrial publicity about the accused's prior conviction for the
theft of the Star of India sapphire. Juror voir dire did not reveal a
"pattern of deep and bitter prejudice"1 40 toward the defendant;
while 20 of the 48 persons inteviewed were excused because they
held an opinion as to the defendant's guilt, those who were impan-
eled as jurors indicated that they could try the case impartially.
The pretrial publicity in Stroble v. California1 4 1 included the
prosecution's release of certain details from the defendant's re-
corded confession. However, the Court found that the petitioner
did not show a denial of due process since publicity ended six
weeks prior to trial, the accused did not move for a change of
venue, and his confession was found voluntary and was admitted
at trial.
The conclusions that can be drawn from these cases afford
neither a precise definition of prejudicial pretrial publicity nor a
clear indication of when a defendant's due process rights have been
denied. However, where a denial of due process is alleged, the bur-
den is on the defendant-petitioner to show on appeal that such a
denial resulted from prejudicial pretrial publicity. While publica-
tion of a confession or a past criminal record is highly prejudicial,
it is not dispositive of the due process issue.
The defendant also has the responsibility of pursuing the proce-
dural means for assuring a fair trial, such as motions for change of
venue or continuance. Additionally, the trial judge has the affirma-
tive responsibility of shielding criminal defendants from trial amid
an environment of "deep and bitter prejudice." Further, proper
courtroom decorum must always be maintained.
Preliminary hearings-including suppression hearings-are not
generally regarded as part of the criminal trial."' While most pre-
trial proceedings are open, no public "right" of access to them
stems from either common law or American legal tradition.14 3 Sev-
139. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
140. Id. at 800-03; cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
141. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
142. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1883).
143. Geis, Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 397, 407 (1961).
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eral states, including the influential jurisdictions of California and
New York, have statutes specifically conferring the right to a
closed pretrial proceeding on the accused.'" These statutes have
been upheld in many state court challenges."
Suppression hearings are a special type of pretrial proceeding in
criminal cases. Suppression hearings have their origin in the Exclu-
sionary Rule, which in turn was engendered by the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 46
Put quite simply, the Exclusionary Rule is intended to deter viola-
tions of the Fourth Amendment by forbidding the introduction
into evidence of any information that is obtained in disregard of a
defendant's rights under that Amendment. The government is pro-
hibited from exploiting its illegal acts in order to secure convic-
tions. Exclusion is not automatic and must be sought by a timely
motion. A defendant may seek to suppress evidence gained in an
unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment,'" coerced confessions, and statements obtained in violation
of the strictures of Miranda v. Arizona.4 8
It is at a suppression hearing that the peculiar tension between
the public's right to have access to information about the criminal
justice system and the rights of a defendant to a fair trial by an
impartial jury is most clearly evident. The purpose of a suppres-
sion hearing is to screen out inadmissible evidence in order to in-
sure that it does not come to the jury's attention, thereby prejudic-
ing the accused's rights. Publication of inadmissible evidence
subverts the function of the hearing. At the same time, the public
has a legitimate right to the information which is made available at
suppression hearings, for it is there that direct evidence of police
144. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.60(9) (McKinney 1971); CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West
1965); 17 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 9.3(b) (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-615 (1977); IDAHO
CODE § 19-811 (1979); IOWA CODE § 813.2, Rule 2(4) (d) (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
95-1202 (c) (Smith 1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.204 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-14
(Smith 1974); PA. RULE CRIM. PROC. 323(f) (Purdon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-13
(Smith 1978).
145. See e.g., People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225 (1960); People v. Pratt, 27
A.D. 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1967); Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968); State v.
Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149, 450 P.2d 115 (1969).
146. See W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS (1972); Weeks v.
U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applied Exclusionary Rule to
states).
147. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
148. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Other key cases in this area include Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964), and People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965).
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and prosecutorial lawbreaking is received in court.
Given this background information on the Sixth Amendment
public trial provision, the nature of pretrial publicity, and suppres-
sion hearings, Justice Stewart's application of the Sixth Amend-
ment in Gannett may be better analyzed.
Justice Stewart interpreted the public trial provision as a guar-
antee created solely for the benefit of the defendant."* While ac-
knowledging "a common law rule of open civil and criminal pro-
ceedings,"o50 Justice Stewart stated that "not many common law
rules have been elevated to the status of constitutional rights.""'
He seemingly relied on the express words of the Sixth Amendment
to find "that members of the public have no constitutional right
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal
trials." 52
While Justice Stewart recognized the strong societal interest in
public trials, he maintained that the public interest is adequately
protected by the participants in the litigation,"'5 particularly by
the public prosecutor and the trial judge, who theoretically are
deemed by the voters to be public guardians.'"
Justice Stewart's analysis of the Sixth Amendment public trial
provision suffers from several severe faults. Most importantly, it is
overbroad. Nothing in the factual situation or legal questions
presented by the case justified the "holding" that "members of the
public have no constitutional right . .. to attend criminal tri-
als."o55 The problem presented by the case involved access to a
pretrial suppression hearing, not a criminal trial."* Statements
which do not directly address the issue of the case are actually
dicta, which lack the binding force of law."'
149. 443 U.S. at 379-80.
150. Id. at 384.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 391.
153. Id. at 383.
154. Id. at 384.
155. Id. at 391.
156. Note that this was not Justice Stewart's approach-he defined the question as one of
access to a pretrial judicial proceeding. 443 U.S. at 370. The proceeding in question was a
suppression hearing, 443 U.S. at 375-76, which is historically and legally a unique, particu-
lar event. See text accompanying notes 145-47, supra.
157. See H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS
394, 395 (1896). Black, author of the famous Law Dictionary, notes that "gratis dicta" are
statements more broad or general than is necessary for determination of the case before the
court. Dicta are "extra-judicial"-rendered without jurisdiction. Id. at 397.
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To be fair to the Court, it should be noted that in his concurring
opinion and public statements about the case, Chief Justice Burger
attempted to erase or mitigate the misleading effect of the above
"holding."15 * However, his efforts had been undercut by Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion, which bolstered Justice Stewart's
unqualified statement that the public has no constitutional right of
access to criminal trials.15' Unfortunately, this misstatement has
led to unusual numbers of both closures and attempts to close
criminal trials.160
While Justice Stewart noted the importance of public trials to
society, he did not apply these principles in Gannett. One of the
primary functions of open trials is to guard against judicial and
prosecutorial malfeasance. 11 The public is interested not only in
preventing abuses of the defendant by the judicial system, but also
in insuring the impartiality of proceedings. 1" In short, the citi-
zenry has a profound interest in observing how public officials do
their jobs. The notion that the public interest can be protected by
district attorneys and trial judges disregards the possibility of cor-
ruption in the judicial system."*
Justice Stewart's reliance on the express words of the Sixth
Amendment to find that public trials are only for the benefit of
the accused also disregards another possible construction of that
Amendment. While an amendment may assure one party or class
of persons a particular right, it should not be construed as a denial
of that same right to others. The Ninth Amendment is a direct
statement by the framers that the legal maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius"1 " has no place in constitutional interpretation.'"
158. 443 U.S. at 394. See NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1979, at 69; San Francisco Sunday Exam-
iner & Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1979, § A, at 20, col. 1.
159. 443 U.S. at 403.
160. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 158, at 69; 65 A.B.A.J. 1290 (1979); San Francisco Sun-
day Examiner & Chronicle, supra note 158; San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 10, 1979, at 8, col.
3; Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant, Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct.
2814 (1980) at 13 n.11; but see Brief for Appellee, Richmond Newspapers, at 12-13.
161. See text accompanying notes 85-88, supra.
162. Id.
163. See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 412-13 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
164. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521
(Rev. 5th Ed. 1979).
165. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
"This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any . . . misapplication of the well-
known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others ... .
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Since the public had the right under the common law to attend
trials prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and since no pro-
vision of the Constitution speaks directly to the public's right of
access, it seems reasonable to assert that the framers of the Consti-
tution intended to leave undisturbed the people's access to the
courts.
It should be noted that Justice Stewart's analysis of access to
suppression hearings is historically and constitutionally accurate.
However, it is, as noted above, somewhat overbroad. There was no
need to discuss pretrial proceedings; Justice Stewart could have
narrowed his focus to suppression hearings alone. Moreover, the
Justice's failure to delineate standards for defining instances in
which closure of hearings is mandated by law and policy has left
lower courts in conflict. 66 One cannot overlook the Gannett court's
inconsistency in this area. A majority of the Court upheld closure
of a judicial proceeding in which all publicity had halted three
months before the hearing at issue took place. 67 Nothing in the
opinion, or in the briefs of petitioner or respondents, demonstrated
the existence of a prejudicial environment similar to that which
made impanelling impartial juries impossible in past cases.
While the Estes, Irvin, Sheppard, and Rideau'" cases all in-
volved trials rather than preliminary proceedings, they illustrate
the kinds of publicity and "atmosphere" that can endanger the due
process rights of an accused person. Nothing in Gannett indicates
the existence of a "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice" in Seneca
County which would have precluded selection of an impartial
jury." Judge DePasquale preserved courtroom decorum, and the
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at 651 (5th ed.
1891); see also at 544, 571.
See also 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1031 (1971), quot-
ing James Madison, primary author of the Bill of Rights: "It has been objected also against
a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration . . . . This is one of the
most plausible arguments . . . against admission of a bill of rights . . . but, I conceive, that
it may be guarded against . . . [by] the last clause of the fourth resolution" (later to become
the Ninth Amendment).
See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
TRIBE, supra note 47, at 569-72. One may conclude that the Ninth Amendment is, at the
very least, a rule of constitutional construction; at most, it is an assurance of the retention
of the common-law rights the people enjoyed prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
166. See 443 U.S. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring).
167. 443 U.S. 374-75.
168. See text accompanying notes 116, 119, 122, and 123, supra.
169. Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1966).
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devices of continuance, change of venue, voir dire, and sequestra-
tion were still available to the defense. Nothing in the case or the
briefs indicates that these more acceptable means of assuring juror
impartiality were insufficient to prevent the possible denial of due
process rights. In fact, the situation in Gannett closely resembles
cases where the Supreme Court has held that there was no denial
of due process.17 0
5. An Alternative Analysis
It has been implied several times in this note that the issue in
Gannett was improperly framed, making a bad result inevitable.
The issue in Gannett was whether the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution gave the press and the public a
right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing in a criminal case.
One can argue that, by analogy, because of the Sixth Amend-
ment's public trial provision, a right in the public to attend sup-
pression hearings exists; however, this is not the best approach.
The Exclusionary Rule and suppression hearings developed long
after the passage of the Bill of Rights and have their theoretical
origin in the Fourth Amendment. It is thus historically inaccurate
and ultimately unsatisfactory to base a right of access to suppres-
sion proceedings on the Sixth Amendment.
The analysis must turn instead to the "penumbra" concept, the
argument that certain amendments have attached, unenumerated
rights necessary to the proper functioning of these amendments in
the context of a free society.1 71
The free press and open trial provisions of the First and Sixth
Amendments are ineffective without a right of public access to pre-
trial suppression hearings. In order for members of the public to
preserve their own rights, they must be able to see when another's
rights have been violated by those sworn to uphold the law. How-
ever, the right to know of threats to freedom must not be allowed
to destroy the right of an accused to receive a fair trial by an im-
partial jury. Accordingly, the alternative of partial closure of pre-
trial suppression hearings becomes reasonable.
For the most part, pretrial suppression hearings focus on two
matters: the method by which allegedly inadmissible evidence was
170. See text accompanying notes 137-40, supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 47-53, supra.
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obtained and the evidence itself. It is possible to structure a hear-
ing so that the public may be present when the former problem is
dealt with but excluded when the latter is discussed. Such a proce-
dure would safeguard the public's rights while enabling the defense
to prevent illegally obtained and possibly prejudicial evidence from
reaching potential jurors.172
In many cases, partial closure would achieve the desired goal of
permitting public access to these proceedings at all times except
when closure is necessary to preserve the defendant's right to an
unprejudiced jury. Nevertheless, this procedural alternative is not
a panacea. A high level of responsibility on the part of the trial
judge will be necessary to control the hearing and achieve the
stated goal. Instructions to witnesses, cautioning them to confine
themselves solely to the method used in obtaining the proffered
evidence, can be used to eliminate introduction of the evidence in
open court; these instructions can be enforced with the court's con-
tempt power. In some problematic cases, the nexus between the
challenged evidence and the means by which it was obtained may
be so inextricable that partial closure may be precluded. Further,
both prosecution and defense attorneys may resist this new proce-
dure, since neither side has a real interest in public access to pre-
trial suppression hearings. Participants in the litigation are likely
to be far more concerned with preserving the defendant's rights in
order to secure a procedurally unassailable conviction or acquittal.
Thus, the immediate business of the trial court and the litigants
will not be advanced by the use of partial closure; the interest in-
volved belongs uniquely to the public.
Because of its protective function, a motion for partial closure
could be made by any participant in the trial: prosecution, defense,
or court. Since the public interest is affected, the motion may be
opposed by members of the press and public who make a timely
objection, as well as any of the parties. In order to prevail, the pro-
ponent of the motion should show and the court accordingly find:
(1) that a high level of publicity about the trial exists; (2) that the
publicity has reached the jury pool; (3) that, given a completely
open suppression hearing, publications of the challenged evidence
will probably reach prospective jurors; (4) that partial closure
would protect the defendant's rights; and (5) that no other proce-
172. See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 445 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) for support of this procedural alternative.
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dure available will adequately prevent the threatened harm.
Such closure will not be necessary in the great majority of crimi-
nal cases, which neither attract much attention nor go to trial." 3
However, whenever a defendant's rights are endangered, partial
closure could be used.
6. Conclusion: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia17 4
Not surprisingly, the release of the decision in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale generated an extreme response; criticism from the
press and the legal community was both immediate and harsh.1 75
This reaction may have influenced the Court's acceptance of an
appeal from the Virginia Supreme Court in the case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, which offered the Court an opportu-
nity to clarify Gannett's muddled "holding."
Richmond Newspapers developed from Stevenson v. Common-
wealth of Virginia."17  Defendant John Paul Stevenson had been
tried three times for murder. His first conviction had been over-
turned and the case remanded for retrial because of improper ad-
mission of a blood-stained shirt. His second trial ended in a mis-
trial after a juror asked to be excused. Stevenson's third trial also
ended in a mistrial because a prospective juror had read newspaper
accounts of the previous trials and had discussed the case with
other potential jurors.17 7
At the outset of Stevenson's fourth trial in 1978, defense counsel
moved to exclude the press and public, saying: "I don't want any
information being shuffled back and forth when we have a recess as
to what-who testified to what."1 78 Trial judge Richard H. C. Tay-
lor granted the motion on the basis of Virginia Code §19.2-266,"7
which reads (in pertinent part):
"In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or
misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from
173. FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 10, at 69-70.
174. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
175. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 158; 65 A.B.A.J. 1290 (1979); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2841 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
176. 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 779 (1977).
177. See Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 9 n.6; Brief for Appellee at 2-3; 100 S.
Ct. at 2818.
178. Brief for Appellee at 3-4; 100 S. Ct. at 2819.
179. Brief for Appellee at 4; 100 S. Ct. at 2819.
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the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of
a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial
shall not be violated."
Appellants Timothy Wheeler and Keven McCarthy, reporters for
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., were among the members of the pub-
lic excluded from the trial. They challenged the order later the
same day, after counsel had been obtained.180 Richmond Newspa-
pers based its arguments against the order on the First Amend-
ment. Stevenson's attorney stated that an open courtroom would
jeopardize his client's right to a fair trial, since the problem of
publicity was unusually acute in the small community.18' However,
the record does not show that defense counsel moved for seques-
tration of the jury or attempted to employ any other methods to
preserve juror impartiality. 8 2
After balancing the competing rights of defendant, press, and
public, Judge Taylor declined to vacate his closure order. He noted
that the layout of the 245-year-old courtroom was such that spec-
tators tended to distract the jury.88
The closed trial resumed on September 12, 1978. In the absence
of the jury, the press, and the public, Judge Taylor granted the
defense motion to strike the evidence against the accused "on
grounds stated to the record." 84 The trial court then found the
defendant not guilty of murder. 88
Although tapes were available to the public after the trial en-
ded,' appellants Richmond Newspapers, Wheeler, and McCarthy
petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for appeal, and for writs of
prohibition and mandamus.18 7 All the requests for relief were de-
nied summarily, with no discussion of the merits. In support of
these results, the Virginia court cited only Gannett v. DePas-
quale.88 Richmond Newspapers then sought review in the U.S. Su-
180. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 8; 100 S. Ct. at 2819.
181. Brief for Appellee at 4; 100 S. Ct. at 2819.
182. See 100 S. Ct. at 2818-20; Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 8; Brief for Ap-
pellee at 4.
183. Brief for Appellee at 5. It is worth noting that no trial had ever been closed in the
Hanover County Courthouse in its 245-year history. See Jurisdictional Statement for Appel-
lant at 2 n.1.
184. 100 S. Ct. at 2820. It is not clear what these "grounds" in the record were.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2820 n.3. Whether the tapes were a partial or unabridged version of the trial is
not made clear in the opinion.
187. Id. at 2820.
188. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants, Appendices A, B and C at la-5a.
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preme Court, which granted appellant's petition for writ of
certiorari. 189
The eagerly awaited decision of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia was released by the Court on July 2, 1980, one year after
Gannett was decided. In Richmond, described as a "watershed
case" by concurring Justice John Paul Stevens,190 the Court, in a
judgment by Chief Justice Burger, specifically held "that the right
to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment. . . ."19 In so holding, the Chief Justice applied a
functional analysis" of the First Amendment, emphasizing the
critical role of the communications media in collecting and distrib-
uting information to the public.193 Based on legal history, the
Court found that "a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice."'" Chief
Justice Burger wrote: "[T]he First Amendment's guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from sum-
marily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the
public at the time that amendment was adopted."195 The Court's
judgment also reiterated its past statements which indicated that
the First Amendment's right of assembly' permits people to
gather in public places for any lawful purpose subject only to the
traditional "time, place, and manner" restrictions."*
Appellee Commonwealth of Virginia contended that, because the
Constitution does not explicitly confer a right to the public to at-
tend trials, no such right exists.198 The Chief Justice noted that the
framers of the Constitution were concerned that the specific enu-
meration of certain rights could be interpreted to exclude others;'
passage of the Ninth Amendment, wrote Chief Justice Burger,
189. 100 S. Ct. at 2820.
190. Id. at 2830.
191. Id. at 2829.
192. Id. at 2827. See text accompanying notes 46-53.
193. 100 S. Ct. at 2825, 2827 n.12, 2828.
194. Id. at 2825.
195. Id. at 2827.
196. See note 5, supra.
197. 100 S. Ct. at 2828. Unfortunately, the traditional limitations on the exercise of First
Amendment rights preclude the application of this doctrine to prisons, as in Houchins; the
Court thereby claims consistency with past rulings. See text accompanying notes 68-72,
supra.
198. 100 S. Ct. at 2828.
199. Id. at 2829. See note 165 and text accompanying, supra.
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"served to allay [those] fears."200 He pointed out that "arguments
such as the State makes have not precluded recognition of impor-
tant rights not enumerated.""0 "
The effect of the Court's judgment in Richmond upon the inter-
pretation of Gannett was staggering, because the Chief Justice de-
liberately rectified some of the problems he perceived in the Gan-
nett opinion. Gannett was specifically limited to its facts; Chief
Justice Burger wrote that Gannett "held that the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee to the accused of a public trial gave neither the
public nor the press an enforceable right of access to a pretrial
suppression hearing."2 0 2 Gannett was also cited for the narrow
proposition that "although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused a right to a public trial, it does not give a right to a private
trial."20 3 This interpretation of the law greatly reduced the uncer-
tainty left by Gannett.
Unambiguous as it is, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
still leaves the First Amendment issue raised by petitioner Gan-
nett Company unanswered, because the judgment in Richmond
does not apply to pretrial suppression hearings. Any First Amend-
ment right of access to these hearings is still very uncertain. The
press and public remain in the position of having only some sort of
limited, implied First Amendment right of access, despite the
strong language of Richmond regarding the people's freedom to as-
semble in any public place for any lawful purpose.2" Further, stan-
dards for admission or exclusion to suppression hearings are still
unclear. If the minor amount of publicity found under the facts of
Gannett can create a "reasonable probability of prejudice" to the
defendant's right to an impartial jury, thereby providing justifica-
tion for closure, the First Amendment right of access to pretrial
200. Id. at n.15. Richmond is one of the very few cases where the Ninth Amendment has
been used to support a public rather than a private right; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1964), where the amendment was used to support a right of marital privacy.
201. 100 S. Ct. at 2829.
202. Id. at 2821 (emphasis in original).
203. Id. at 2829. Note, however, that this statement is dictum since Gannett did not in-
volve a trial.
The concurring opinions also offer revisionist views of the Gannett holding. For example,
Justice Stevens wrote that "the perfectly unambiguous holding in Gannett [was] that the
rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment are rights that may be asserted by the accused
rather than members of the general public." 100 S. Ct. at 2831 n.2. See also 100 S. Ct. at
2832 (Brennan, J., concurring) and 2839 (Stewart, J., concurring).
204. See text accompanying note 197, supra.
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suppression hearings appears flimsy. 05 The Court's acceptance of
this standard is unsatisfying for several reasons. As previously dis-
cussed,06 it is a radical departure from the traditional First
Amendment standard which substantially protects the public's
need for information.
Also, guidelines for applying this vague standard were not pro-
vided by the Court. The Court's approval of the result reached by
Judge DePasquale indicates that "reasonable probability" in prac-
tice means "some possibility," since the publicity described in
Gannett simply is not a high level of press coverage.
Still, Gannett and Richmond taken together open the way for
the Supreme Court to specifically define a First Amendment right
of access to pretrial suppression hearings. Defenders of the First
Amendment's speech and press clause may also find comfort in the
absolutist language of Justice Hugo Black, quoted by the Chief
Justice in Richmond: "For the First Amendment does not speak
equivocally. . . . It must be taken as a command of the broadest
scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty loving
society, will allow."2 07
205. Even this meager First Amendment access right may cause problems for state legis-
lators and judges, for the constitutionality of provisions conferring the right to a closed
pretrial proceeding on the accused is questionable, given the implication in Gannett that
there is a First Amendment right of access.
206. See text accompanying notes 62-64, supra.
207. 100 S. Ct. at 2827, quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
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